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Sentencing Mothers: the rights of the child and the duties of the criminal courts 
 
Rona Epstein 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in October 2000. Section 6 of the Act obliges 
all public bodies, including, of course, the courts, to comply with the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1950) (ECHR) states that everyone has the right to respect for private and family 
life. As imprisonment of a father or mother entails the forcible separation of a child from its 
parents and therefore impacts on the child’s Article 8 rights, a sentencing court must 
therefore conduct a balancing exercise weighing the Article 8 rights of the child against the 
seriousness of the parent’s offence. This article reports on research I have undertaken to 
explore to what extent, if at all, the required balancing exercise is being carried out in the 
English sentencing courts and whether the courts are complying with the Human Rights Act 
in this respect. The research covered 50 cases of the imposition of custody (suspended and 
immediate) on mothers who have the care of a dependent child. The article presents 
conclusions from this preliminary study, which principally has found that, although the courts 
do sometimes express concern for the welfare of affected children, they do not, on the whole, 
refer as they should to the rights of the child at the time of sentencing a mother. Although the 
law regarding the rights of the child to a parent’s care applies equally to a father and mother 
this article concentrates on the imprisonment of mothers; in the vast majority of cases, it is 
the custody of the mother that results in the loss of parental care. 
 
 
Key words: imprisonment of mothers, sentencing, criminal courts, European Convention, 
Article 8 ECHR, parents’ and children’s rights. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The number of women entering prison, both on remand and after sentence, has greatly 
increased in recent years. The average female prison population more than doubled between 
1990 and 2007, it was 1,597 on 30 June 1990 and 4,283 on 30 June 2007.  Between 1994 and 
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2004 it increased by 147% (Sandler and Coles, 2008). At the same time studies, and in 
particular the Corston Report published in March 2007, have revealed the extent to which 
women in prison suffer from ill-health and are particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged 
(Corston, 2007). Many women offenders have suffered violence and could also be described 
as victims. Proportionately more women than men are remanded in custody. Coercion by 
men can form a route into criminal activity for some women. The Corston Report found that 
drug addiction plays a huge part in all offending and that this is disproportionately the case 
with women. Mental health problems are also far more prevalent among women in prison 
than in the male prison population or in the general population. Corston reports that, outside 
prison, men are more likely to commit suicide than women but the position is reversed inside 
prison. Self-harm in prison is also a very serious problem and is more prevalent among 
women, 37% of women going into prison reported that they had attempted suicide at some 
time in their life (Corston, 2007). Between 2002 and 2009, there were 55 self-inflicted deaths 
of women prisoners (Plugge, 2006). Similarly, a report published by the Department of 
Public Health at the University of Oxford on the health of 500 women prisoners found that 
78% of women, on reception to prison, exhibit some level of psychological disturbance, 
compared with a figure of 15% for the general adult female population (Plugge, 2006). 
Women prisoners are far more likely than men to be primary carers of young children and 
this factor makes the prison experience significantly different for women. 30% of women in 
prison lose their accommodation while in prison (Corston, 2007).  
 
More than half of women in UK prisons have suffered domestic violence and one in three has 
experienced sexual abuse. The formal educational level of achievement of women prisoners 
is lower than for male prisoners: 74% left school at 16 or before, only 39% have any 
qualifications at all, compared to 82% of the general population. One in four women in prison 
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has spent time in local authority care as a child (Bromley Briefing Prison Reform Trust, 
London: see: http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/). 
 
In recent years there has been a dramatic rise in the number of women in prison, from an 
average of 1560 in 1993 to about 4230 in August 2010. In the past decade the women’s 
prison population has increased by 33%. 11,044 women entered prison in the UK in 2009, 
approximately half of these were on remand, spending an average of four to six weeks in 
prison. Following trial, 61% of women sentenced to custody received sentences of six months 
or less (Prison Reform Trust). In 2008 3,000 women were sentenced to custody for 3 months 
or less, of whom 176 were sentenced to 10 days or less (Ministry of Justice response to 
Freedom of Information request: November 2010). This suggests that a significant number of 
women are imprisoned for relatively minor offences. Many are mothers of dependent 
children. Yet the courts are obliged to take into account the rights of the child to a parent’s 
care and to impose forced separation of mother and child only when it is proportionate to do 
so. This does not fit with large numbers of mothers imprisoned for minor offences.   
 
Much of the rise in the female prison population can be explained by a significant increase in 
the severity of sentences (Hough et al, 2003). In 1996, 10% of women convicted of an 
indictable offence were sent to prison; in 2006 15% were (Ministry of Justice (2007) 
Sentencing Statistics 2006, London). Furthermore, 66% of women prisoners are mothers, and 
each year it is estimated that more than 17,700 children are separated from their mothers by 
imprisonment. Only 5% of women prisoners’ children remain in their own home once their 
mother has been sentenced. At least a third of mothers in prison are lone parents before 
imprisonment (Prison Reform Trust). A Home Office study found that, for 85% of mothers, 
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prison was the first time they had been separated from their children for any significant 
length of time (Home Office, 1997).  
 
There is considerable evidence that separation from their children causes great anxiety and 
distress to mothers in prison (see, for example, Wyner, 2003).  But what of the effects on the 
children? Research in the UK and across Europe on parental imprisonment has identified:  
 
“complex health, social and welfare disadvantages, including the impact of poverty, 
family discord, substance abuse and mental health issues. The imprisonment of 
mothers, for example, has been described as having “wreaked havoc on family 
stability and children’s well-being” (Martynowicz, 2011: 12).  
 
A number of studies have shown long-term detrimental effects on children of the 
incarceration of their parents (Murray, Farrington and Sekol, 2012).  Murray and Murray 
(2010) report that parental incarceration is a strong risk factor for long-lasting 
psychopathology with antisocial outcomes. Parental incarceration might threaten children’s 
attachment security because of parent-child separation, restricted contact with incarcerated 
parents, and unstable caregiving arrangements. Maternal incarceration tends to cause more 
disruption for children than paternal incarceration and may lead to greater risk for insecure 
attachment and psychopathology.   
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 
 
Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) obliges all public bodies, including courts, to 
comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. Section 2 of the Act not only 
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allows UK courts to give effect to Convention rights, but also requires them to consider the 
relevant case law of the Convention when determining disputes concerning such rights and 
their application. Under Section 6 of the Act the courts are made public bodies. Section 6 (1) 
provides that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is inconsistent with a 
Convention right (Foster, 2011).  
 
Article 8 provides that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
When courts sentence a mother with care of a dependent child, the Article 8 rights of the 
child are engaged. This was clearly explained by Lord Phillips, Master of the Rolls, in the 
2001 case R (on the application of P and Q) v Secretary of State for the Home Department1 
which concerned the prison rule that at the age of eighteen months a child had to leave the 
Mother and Baby Unit, causing separation from the mother. Lord Phillips stated that:  
 
“It goes without saying that since 2nd October 2000 sentencing courts have been 
public authorities within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act. If the 
passing of a custodial sentence involves the separation of a mother from her very 
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young child (or, indeed, from any of her children) the sentencing court is bound ... to 
carry out the balancing exercise ... before deciding that the seriousness of the offence 
justifies the separation of mother and child.  If the court does not have sufficient 
information about the likely consequences of the compulsory separation, it must, in 
compliance with its obligations under section 6(1), ask for more …” 
 
Lord Phillips stated that, in sentencing a mother with dependent children, the rights of the 
child have to be weighed against the seriousness of the offence in a ‘balancing exercise’. 
From this statement of judicial principles it is clear that magistrates and judges must: a. 
acquire information about dependent children; and b. balance the Article 8 rights of the child 
against the seriousness of the mother’s offence. These principles were confirmed and re-
stated recently, in the High Court in R (on the application of Amanda Aldous) v Dartford 
Magistrates’ Court2 and in the Court of Appeal in R v Bishop (Wayne Steven).3 Both of these 
cases concerned parents, Mrs Aldous, mother of an autistic 15 year old boy, and Mr Bishop, 
father of five children, on whom custodial sentences had been imposed without adequate 
consideration of the rights of the affected children. Mrs Aldous’s imprisonment for a council 
tax debt was declared unlawful by the High Court, and the Court of Appeal revoked Mr 
Bishop’s sentence of immediate custody and replaced it with a suspended sentence. Both 
courts made strong statements concerning the importance of the consideration of the rights of 
the child. 
 
Enquiries undertaken at the Judicial College, whose role is to train the judiciary, indicate that, 
following the entry into force of the Human Rights Act and decisions in the early cases (R 
(Stokes) and R (P and Q), no training was given to either judges or to the justices’ clerks who 
advise the magistrates on the law, concerning their new duties as explained Lord Phillips.4 It 
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appears that sentencers have not been trained as to how they should acquire the relevant 
knowledge of dependent children or how, having acquired such information, they should 
conduct the required balancing exercise.   
 
Sentencing Practice 
 
Using the basic principles identified in the above cases, I have conducted research to explore 
to what extent, if at all, the balancing exercise, described by Lord Phillips, takes place when 
sentencers consider custody for mothers. The study covered 50 cases of imprisonment of 
mothers: 2 in magistrates’ courts, 14 in Crown Courts and 34 in the Court of Appeal. 
 
i. Methods 
 
Sentencing remarks made by magistrates, Crown Court judges and the Court of Appeal at the 
time of sentencing were analysed to examine how the sentencers referred to dependent 
children and whether the balancing exercise weighing the child’s Article 8 rights against the 
seriousness of the offence appeared to have been carried out. The sentencing remarks came 
from three sources: the website of the Court of Appeal reports decisions of sentencing 
appeals,5 press reports and the charity Women in Prison6 which works in all the women’s 
prisons and has provided a conduit for relevant information. The study also includes two 
committals ordered in the Magistrates’ Courts. The availability of data imposes significant 
limitations, using these search methods, it has not been possible to collect information on 
mothers imprisoned on short sentences. As discussed earlier, most women are sent to prison 
for short periods, 61% for less than 6 months and 27% for less than 3 months. Press reports 
tend to be of notorious cases, usually involving assaults or large-scale fraud, which are not 
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typical of women in prison. The cases referred to the Court of Appeal are, of course, the more 
serious cases. For those women on short sentences there is little point in making an appeal.  
The charity Women in Prison supports women who are experiencing problems and these 
most often arise in the course of long periods of incarceration. Research on the sentencing of 
women to short and very short terms of imprisonment should be conducted, but was not 
possible in this project.   
 
The other limitation is in the nature of sentencing remarks. The duty of the judge is set out in 
statute, the court must ‘state in open court, in ordinary language and in general terms, its 
reasons for deciding on the sentence passed’.7 On pronouncing sentence, judges have many 
issues to bear in mind, among them are the seriousness of the offence and any aggravating 
features; the defendant’s previous convictions, if any; the effect on the victim (if there is an 
identifiable victim) and often the presence of the victim and his or her family in court; the 
mitigation put forward by the defence; the sentencing guidelines issued by the Sentencing 
Council; the awareness of public expectation that wrong-doing will be punished and the 
public view that only imprisonment is real punishment. There is always the possibility that 
the judge may have considered the rights of the child, and conducted some sort of balancing 
exercise, but not articulated this in the sentencing remarks. Nevertheless, it can be argued that 
the study of sentencing remarks reveals much about the attitudes and reasoning of judges. If 
the sentencer takes the rights of the child into account, and conducts the required balancing 
exercise, it is reasonable to expect that this will be reflected in some way in the course of the 
sentencing remarks.  
 
ii. The cases studied 
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The oldest case was 2003 (Gidney), and the most recent November 2011, thus the research 
covered a period of 8 years, with most cases occurring between 2009 and 2011. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
  
The offences committed are detailed in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
The shortest sentence was two weeks for Council Tax default; the longest was 15 years for 
drugs importation. There were five suspended sentences and 45 sentences of immediate 
custody. There were two sentences of imprisonment reduced by the Court of Appeal to a 
Community Order (see Figure 3).  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
All the defendants/appellants studied were the mothers of dependent children. The law 
reports, sentencing remarks and press reports studied indicate that about 105 children under 
the age of 18 were living with the defendants/appellants at the time of sentencing. Several 
were very young infants, only a few weeks old and there were 9 babies under 24 months. 
There were a number of cases where the children were disabled: Amanda Aldous (see below, 
unlawfully imprisoned for council tax debt) has an autistic son who is very difficult to look 
after. While she was in prison for 74 days (of a 90 day sentence), Mrs Aldous’s daughter 
looked after the boy, and found this a struggle — she was 8 months pregnant at the time. 
When her baby was born she was of low birth weight; the obstetrician said that this was 
probably due to stress suffered during the pregnancy.   
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iii. Findings 
 
An analysis of the sentencing remarks of Crown Court judges, the reports of the Court of 
Appeal and the magistrates’ files indicates that the required balancing exercise is not usually 
undertaken. In none of the 50 sentencing remarks studied was mention made of the Article 8 
rights of affected children. This does not mean that sentencers are silent on the matter of 
defendants’ dependent children. The care of children has long been regarded as a mitigating 
factor. The most recent Guidelines of the Sentencing Council provide a list of ‘Factors 
reducing seriousness or reflecting personal mitigation’ and the last item on the list reads: 
‘Sole or primary carer for dependent relatives.’8 Sentencers express, in various ways, their 
awareness of the plight of children of imprisoned mothers. However, this is not the same as 
taking account of the child’s Article 8 rights and conducting the balancing exercise to weigh 
the child’s rights against the seriousness of the offence, which requires the court to obtain 
information on the dependent children, their ages and any special needs, on who would care 
for them if their mother was in custody etc. An analysis of the sentencing remarks in these 50 
cases suggests that sentencers often do not seek information on the dependent children, 
although the law requires them to do so. In this study there were five cases where the 
sentencing remarks or notes in the magistrates’ court made no mention at all of the dependent 
children.  
 
The decision in R v Gidney (Warwick Crown Court, 2003) was the starting point of this 
research and illustrates the tragic consequences which may ensue when a mother is 
imprisoned. Leanne Gidney was 18 years old and the mother of a two-year-old child. She was 
a heroin addict who had attempted to rob a 16 year old student of the sum of £1. The judge 
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ordered her to serve six months of an earlier sentence and twelve months for the attempted 
robbery, a total of 18 months.  The sentencing remarks do not mention her child. Eleven days 
into her sentence, she committed suicide. In a case of benefit fraud, where the defendant was 
31 years old and the mother of three young children, the judge at the Crown Court made no 
mention of the children. Looking at several sentencing remarks in cases of benefit fraud, I 
have found that the courts stress that they must impose custody as a deterrent to other 
potential defrauders of the benefits system.  Punishment for deterrent purposes is indeed one 
of the purposes of imprisonment. However, punishment may be imposed in other ways, such 
as a community order or a suspended term of imprisonment, which would mark the court’s 
(and the public’s) disapproval, without having such a devastating effect on young children. 
As explained above, it is the duty of the court to obtain information on dependent children in 
cases of an accused parent of a dependent child. In a case involving misfeasance in a public 
office (granting extension of student leave to would-be immigrants), the judge at Crown 
Court appeared to refuse to obtain information relating to the defendant’s children. The 
defendant was a single parent, sole carer of four children ages 19, 9, 7, and 5. In thiss case, 
the trial judge said ‘I am asked to adjourn sentence for a pre-sentence report. I am bound to 
say that I do not consider that a pre-sentence report would assist me’. A pre-sentence report 
would normally tell the court whether dependent children were living with the defendant, 
how old they were, if any had disabilities or special needs, and who would care for them in 
the event of the mother going to prison. Accordingly, the failure of the judge to consider the 
rights of the children appears to be in breach not only of article 8 ECHR but also the 
established sentencing guidelines. 
 
The courts usually regard the fact that the defendant is caring for a child as a mitigating 
factor. Thus, in R v McClue9 the Court of Appeal stated that the appellant, who had 
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committed fraud, had a daughter age seven who suffered from the abandonment by her father 
and was emotionally vulnerable. Further, the Court noted that the appellant’s sister suffered 
from schizophrenia and that the appellant has looked after her sister’s four year old child 
since her birth. In hearing an appeal against sentence, the Court of Appeal said:  
“The effect on these two children of the loss of the appellant and the fear of separation 
has been devastating for them…We have been moved by the mitigation factors ... and 
in particular the disastrous consequences for the appellant’s child and her sister’s 
child.”  
 
Accordingly, the court reduced the sentence from 18 to 8 months. This is an instance of a 
court showing awareness and sympathy for the plight of children separated from the mother 
by imprisonment. While this concern for the welfare of children is, of course, a humane 
approach to criminal justice, to be lauded, I would argue that having some regard for the 
welfare of children is not the same thing as giving weight to the child’s Article 8 rights. I 
found rare instances where the courts consider the welfare of the affected children, and then 
suspend the sentence of imprisonment. For example, in one case studied, sentencing a mother 
for benefit fraud, the judge at Crown Court said: 
 
“[Y]ou have chosen to have a large family, I do not criticise you for that ... You have 
a child who has significant difficulties, she is 13, and I am told ... that, if deprived of 
your care, it would have a significant detrimental effect upon her.  You have another 
16 year old child who has learning difficulties” 
 
Her husband had very serious health problems. In this case her sentence of 10 months’ 
imprisonment was suspended for two years. This case shows that, where there are 
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exceptionally vulnerable children, the court may, on occasion, consider the possible effects of 
a mother’s imprisonment, and order a suspended sentence. The needs of the children (not 
their Article 8 rights) are here being considered by the court, however this case is an 
exception to the general findings of this research that the potential effects on children are not 
normally determinative of the sentencing decision. 
 
This research has found that there are considerable differences in how courts consider the 
children of defendants. Although the Article 8 rights of the child are not specifically 
mentioned, some courts say that the effects of imprisonment on children must be considered 
and refer to:  
“the well- understood principle that an offender who is the carer of three young 
children should be sentenced to imprisonment only if that is absolutely necessary, and 
secondly, if it is, for the shortest term that is conceivably commensurate with the 
offences in question’.10  
 
In a number of the cases studied it appears that the courts regard exceptionally needy and 
disabled children as having a right to care and weigh this consideration against the 
seriousness of the offence. However rhe Court of Appeal cites ‘the effect on children’, not the 
child's Article 8 rights. For example, in R v Shantelle Davis11 the defendant was initially 
sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for blackmail but the Court of Appeal reduced it to 9 
months suspended imprisonment. The defendant had a 23-month-old severely disabled 
daughter, who was blind, had cerebral palsy and required round the clock care. A further 
example is R v Lisa Ann Dawson12 which illustrates the importance which some courts give 
to the welfare of young children. Dawson pleaded guilty to being concerned in supplying 
cocaine, and was sentenced to 30 weeks’ imprisonment. She was pregnant at the time and 
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was also the primary carer of her two-year-old son. In considering the appeal against the 
sentence the Court of Appeal stated that: 
 
“Being parted from her son has been extremely difficult for her.  She has for lengthy 
periods refused to leave her cell. The effect on her son of the absence of his mother 
can be imagined ... [W]e consider that the appellant’s pregnancy, although material, is 
very much less important than the welfare of her two year old son ... Of course, the 
mere fact that an offender is a mother or father or other carer does not mean that she 
or he cannot be made the subject of an immediate sentence of imprisonment, and 
some crimes are so serious that only an immediate term of imprisonment will be 
appropriate. However, there are other cases in which the stress and disorientation 
caused to a family by the absence of a parent or other carer may justify either a non-
custodial sentence of the suspension of a sentence of imprisonment, particularly 
where the length of any sentence could properly only be short.”  
 
The Court of Appeal revoked the sentence of imprisonment and replaced it with a 12-month 
community order. 
 
The failure to consider the rights of the child was starkly evident in the two cases studied 
which were of imprisonment for debt. Two of the forms filled in by serving prisoners through 
the work of Women in Prison came from mothers committed by magistrates for council tax 
default. This was surprising since, except in rare circumstances, imprisonment for council tax 
debt is unlawful. The statute governing payment of tax debt provides that the courts may 
order deduction from salary or from benefit in order to enforce payment of the debt.13  The 
powers to imprison are coercive, intended to force payment where the debtor has the means 
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to pay, and are not punitive (Epstein, 2011; Epstein, 1998; Epstein and Wise, 1995). The 
magistrates have to bear in mind that imprisonment is a last resort and all alternatives must be 
tried first. CD was on income support when she appeared before the magistrates for council 
tax default. The magistrates should have ordered a deduction from her benefits to repay the 
tax owed, rather than impose imprisonment. She was a single mother of a 6-year-old child. 
Her child was not mentioned in the file notes. This appears to be a clear example of a blatant 
breach of the principle that in considering imposition of imprisonment, the rights of the 
affected child must be considered, and must be weighed against the seriousness of the 
offence. In this case, there is no criminal offence; council tax debt is a civil debt and is not a 
crime. There is also the case of Amanda Aldous. On 14 January 2011 Dartford Magistrates 
committed her to prison for 90 days for failure to pay Council Tax arrears amounting to 
approximately £7,000 for the period 2003 to 2009. She is the mother of five children and had 
been the victim of domestic violence. Her youngest child is aged 15 and has been diagnosed 
with autism and other associated conditions. She was sent immediately to prison where she 
served 74 days of the sentence.  he had not been in custody before and this was the first time 
she had been separated from her autistic son. In the normal course of events, a prisoner such 
as Mrs Aldous has no way to challenge her imprisonment. It was only because her case came 
to my attention during this research that anyone acted on her behalf. When I read the form 
she filled in giving her reason for imprisonment as ‘council tax default’, I realised that this 
imprisonment was unlawful, and took steps to find a barrister and solicitor who would act for 
her. On 29 March 2011, following a High Court application, she was granted bail. On 6 July 
2011 at the High Court the decision of Dartford Magistrates to commit her to prison was 
declared unlawful and was quashed. It was unlawful because there were other ways through 
which the local authority might have been able to obtain payment, for example, by 
attachment of the earnings of her husband. Concerning the children, the High Court said:  
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“The existence of children cannot of course keep a person out of prison who should 
properly be sent to prison, but a sentencing court needs to be able to bear in mind 
what the effect on the children will be, and, if there are children and if the court does 
not have to information it needs in order to assess the effect of the parent’s 
imprisonment on them, then the court must make enquiries so that it is properly 
informed. Those enquiries were not made in this case.”14  
 
Conclusion 
 
The family rights of the child and the accused are engaged whenever a mother, having the 
care of a dependent child, is at risk of imprisonment, either on remand or on sentence. A 
study of 50 cases of the imprisonment of mothers, 5 suspended and 45 immediate, has found 
that there is a wide variation in the extent to which the care of dependent children appears to 
be considered in sentencing, with the stress on welfare of children rather than on the child’s 
rights. In some cases, the court makes no mention at all of the accused’s children. In other 
cases the courts allude to the trauma and misery caused to the children, but blame the 
defendant, and do not appear to impose an alternative or reduced sentence. In only a few 
Court of Appeal cases do the judges acknowledge the plight of the child and order a reduction 
in the length of sentence. However, even in the Court of Appeal, specific reference is not 
normally made to the Article 8 rights of the child. Mitigating factors, such as the effects of 
imprisonment on children, relate to the defendant and not directly to the Article 8 rights of 
the child. This research points to the need for the judiciary, the Judicial College, the 
Sentencing Council, and the public to be better informed on these issues, so that, when 
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mothers with dependent children are before the courts, sentencers will bear in mind the 
Article 8 rights of affected children. 
 
This research has found wide variations in the extent to which the courts consider the impact 
that the imprisonment of a mother is likely to have on a dependent child. It would be 
interesting to have further studies which could include interviews with judges and an analysis 
of why there are such great differences. Does it reflect their personal attitudes and 
experiences? To some extent one may hypothesise that this would be the case. It may also be 
the result of differences in their judicial training. Whatever may be the cause of such diversity 
of approach, it cannot be right that some judges appear to ignore the welfare and the rights of 
affected children. Those working in the criminal courts are well aware of great differences in 
approach. This may be to some extent inevitable.   
 
I would argue that there is a need for more rigorous and in-depth training of the judges which 
would result in sentencing that is more uniform in its approach to the rights of the child, and 
in which the balancing exercise weighing the Article 8 rights of the child against the 
seriousness of the offence is always carried out. The fact that this is not always done is 
evidenced by the number of cases, cited and discussed above, where a mother is sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment by a trial judge, and a sentencing appeal in the Court of Appeal 
results in either a considerably reduced sentence or immediate custody replaced with a 
suspended sentence. Some may conclude: ‘Well, the Court of Appeal will come to the rescue 
and justice will be done’. Not so. For the vast majority of mothers in prison there will be no 
sentencing appeal. Those on short sentences will have no opportunity to appeal. Those 
sentenced for council tax debt are not given any advice on applying for bail, and would find 
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great difficulty in mounting a judicial review even if they were advised that this is how their 
sentence must be challenged (Epstein and Wise, 1995). 
 
It is a legal requirement that in every case where a mother with a dependent child is at risk of 
a custodial sentence, the sentencer must acquire information about the dependent children, 
and weigh the Article 8 rights of the children against the seriousness of the offence. In the 
most serious cases the balance will, of course, come down on the side of custody. But in 
some instances the court will suspend imprisonment or impose a community order rather than 
a custodial punishment.  The vast majority of women are imprisoned for less serious offences 
and receive short sentences: the balancing exercise should now take centre stage. 
 
Rona Epstein is an Honorary Research Fellow in the Law School, Coventry University, 
Priory Street, Coventry CV1 5FB. 
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Figure 1: Cases studied by year 
Year 
Number 
cases 
2003 1 
2007 1 
2009 9 
2010 30 
2011 9 
 
  
Figure 2: Offences in cases studied 
 
Offences 
Number of 
cases 
Benefit fraud 10 
Drugs 9 
Perverting the course of justice 6 
Fraud and deception 4 
Assault 3 
Possessing a weapon 3 
Car offences 2 
Council Tax default 2 
Other* 9 
 
* This includes aiding illegal entry to the UK, blackmail, robbery, transfer of criminal 
property, conspiracy to evade duty. 
  
 Figure 3: Sentences 
 
Sentences 
Number of 
cases 
Court of Appeal replaces custody with Community Order 2 
Imprisonment: 6 months or less 17 
                      more than 6 months, up to 1 year 18 
                      more than 1 year, up to 3 years 7 
                      more than 3 years 6 
 
 
